Jan 17 2016
Rouhani’s Foreign Policy：the Second Phase of the Constructive Engagement
By Mohsen Shariatinia and Ehsan Razani
With the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the foreign policy of the Rouhani government has entered a new phase. The Constructive engagement was the most important component of Rouhani’s declared plans for foreign policy during the presidential campaign of 2013. The concept turned into the cornerstone of the president’s foreign policy after taking office. To him “a constructive approach to diplomacy doesn’t mean relinquishing one’s rights. It means engaging with one’s counterparts, on the basis of equal footing and mutual respect, to address shared concerns and achieve shared objectives. In other words, win-win outcomes are not just favorable but also achievable”. “A zero-sum, Cold War mentality leads to everyone’s loss”, Hassan Rouhani wrote in Washington Post on September 19, 2013.
As the first step, Rouhani tried to find a way toward the settlement of the Iran Nuclear Crisis. Although it was a very difficult task, his team finally emerged successful to overcome tensions between Iran and the West. Now the second phase of the Constructive engagement has begun. The present paper tries to figure out the main features of the new chapter of Rouhani’s Constructive engagement.
The first feature of the post-JCPOA era is the Rouhani government’s attempt to maintain the “status quo” in the country’s relationship with the United States. Despite some early optimistic predictions, the time made it increasingly clear that the hostility between Iran and America goes far beyond the nuclear issue. Thus the leaders in both Tehran and Washington convinced that normalization of relations between the two countries would not be achieved at the time being. With this in mind, Rouhani’s foreign policy in the second phase has focused on organizing a kind of slight détente in Iranian-American relations through a series of selective multilateral negotiations on special issues such as the Syrian Crisis.
The second feature of the Constructive engagement would be the improved relationship with the European Union. The EU has always been Iran’s most important trade partner since the inception of the Islamic Republic. However, influenced by the sanctions, the Iran-EU economic and trade relations deteriorated in recent years. According to the statistics of the European Commission, total EU imports from Iran decreased by 86% between 2012-13 while total EU exports decreased by 26% during the same period. As a matter of fact, the sanctions led the EU to be relatively excluded from the Iranian market while deprived Iran of one of the largest economic blocs of the world. Now the two sides have determined to cultivate warmer ties. Since Rouhani took power and with the as the date for the implementation of the JCPOA, European economic and trade delegations have started coming into Tehran. In Iran’s policy circles, the EU has begun to be seen as the most important alternative for economic and trade cooperation as well as the best source of technology and finance. Hence, a combination of factors such as political will on both sides, mutual need and common interests, and huge potentials for expanding cooperation would make strengthening relationship with the EU as the main feature of the Rouhani administration in the second phase of the Constructive engagement. In other words, restoring relations with the EU would occupy a higher position in the Iranian foreign policy's list of priorities.
Needless to say the normalization of relations with the EU would be difficult to be achieved. The negative consequences of the sanctions that can be seen in a variety of matters such as the disagreements among Iranian and French vehicle manufacturing companies and ongoing dispute between the two sides over the human rights and Middle East crises, would be seen as important obstacles to improved relations between Iran and European countries.
The third feature of Rouhani’s policy of Constructive engagement can be considered as “both East and West” policy. Through the past two years, President Rouhani has remained unwilling to focus his foreign policy toward a specific region or country. On this basis, beside European Union, he has attempted to develop warmer ties with China, Russia, and Japan, as well. During this period, he has met Russian and Chinese presidents, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, several times. These meetings have provided his government with a number of achievements such as convincing Kremlin to lift the voluntary ban on the sale of the Russian S300 surface-to-air missiles to his country and making significant progress in attracting China's further investments.
Developing warmer ties with the neighboring countries based on good-neighborliness, mutual respect, and cooperation, has been the third feature of the Constructive engagement. It should be noted that, despite the common belief, Iran is not merely Middle Eastern country. It is, rather, a country that can hold a “multiple” vision of geopolitical relations with the countries of the Central Asia, South Caucasus, as well as the South Asia. Iran would not have much problem in developing ties with its Eastern and Northern neighbors. Not surprisingly, with lifting the sanctions, Iran’s relations with these countries –as well as Iraq- would expand rapidly.
For Tehran, practicing a constructive diplomacy towards the neighboring countries would be to some extent problematic. For years, Iran’s relationship with Saudi Arabia and some of its Southern neighbors has deteriorated. Tehran-Ankara engagement has represented a complex combination of cooperation and competition. However, with Erdogan's consolidation of political power, theTurkish-Iranian competition in Iraq and Syria would continue to rise. Certainly, the Islamic Republic would face lots of difficulties towards the renormalization of relations with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Relations between Tehran and Riyadh have been fraught with enmity, tension, and confrontation, due to the strategic competition between the two countries and their differences in political agendas, ideologies, governance, and religious identity. The two countries have taken widely divergent approaches towards the Shiite Houthis in Yemen, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the situations in Iraq and Syria. With the deepening hostility and formation of a Zero-Sum game between the two states, Constructive engagement with Saudi Arabia would have little chance to improve in the future.
In sum, with the implementation of the JCPOA, Rouhani has attempted to continue the policy of Constructive engagement towards the outside world. With no doubt, the success or failure of his government's initiative in foreign policy, would seriously affect Iran’s future as well as that of its neighbors.
As the first step, Rouhani tried to find a way toward the settlement of the Iran Nuclear Crisis. Although it was a very difficult task, his team finally emerged successful to overcome tensions between Iran and the West. Now the second phase of the Constructive engagement has begun. The present paper tries to figure out the main features of the new chapter of Rouhani’s Constructive engagement.
The first feature of the post-JCPOA era is the Rouhani government’s attempt to maintain the “status quo” in the country’s relationship with the United States. Despite some early optimistic predictions, the time made it increasingly clear that the hostility between Iran and America goes far beyond the nuclear issue. Thus the leaders in both Tehran and Washington convinced that normalization of relations between the two countries would not be achieved at the time being. With this in mind, Rouhani’s foreign policy in the second phase has focused on organizing a kind of slight détente in Iranian-American relations through a series of selective multilateral negotiations on special issues such as the Syrian Crisis.
The second feature of the Constructive engagement would be the improved relationship with the European Union. The EU has always been Iran’s most important trade partner since the inception of the Islamic Republic. However, influenced by the sanctions, the Iran-EU economic and trade relations deteriorated in recent years. According to the statistics of the European Commission, total EU imports from Iran decreased by 86% between 2012-13 while total EU exports decreased by 26% during the same period. As a matter of fact, the sanctions led the EU to be relatively excluded from the Iranian market while deprived Iran of one of the largest economic blocs of the world. Now the two sides have determined to cultivate warmer ties. Since Rouhani took power and with the as the date for the implementation of the JCPOA, European economic and trade delegations have started coming into Tehran. In Iran’s policy circles, the EU has begun to be seen as the most important alternative for economic and trade cooperation as well as the best source of technology and finance. Hence, a combination of factors such as political will on both sides, mutual need and common interests, and huge potentials for expanding cooperation would make strengthening relationship with the EU as the main feature of the Rouhani administration in the second phase of the Constructive engagement. In other words, restoring relations with the EU would occupy a higher position in the Iranian foreign policy's list of priorities.
Needless to say the normalization of relations with the EU would be difficult to be achieved. The negative consequences of the sanctions that can be seen in a variety of matters such as the disagreements among Iranian and French vehicle manufacturing companies and ongoing dispute between the two sides over the human rights and Middle East crises, would be seen as important obstacles to improved relations between Iran and European countries.
The third feature of Rouhani’s policy of Constructive engagement can be considered as “both East and West” policy. Through the past two years, President Rouhani has remained unwilling to focus his foreign policy toward a specific region or country. On this basis, beside European Union, he has attempted to develop warmer ties with China, Russia, and Japan, as well. During this period, he has met Russian and Chinese presidents, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, several times. These meetings have provided his government with a number of achievements such as convincing Kremlin to lift the voluntary ban on the sale of the Russian S300 surface-to-air missiles to his country and making significant progress in attracting China's further investments.
Developing warmer ties with the neighboring countries based on good-neighborliness, mutual respect, and cooperation, has been the third feature of the Constructive engagement. It should be noted that, despite the common belief, Iran is not merely Middle Eastern country. It is, rather, a country that can hold a “multiple” vision of geopolitical relations with the countries of the Central Asia, South Caucasus, as well as the South Asia. Iran would not have much problem in developing ties with its Eastern and Northern neighbors. Not surprisingly, with lifting the sanctions, Iran’s relations with these countries –as well as Iraq- would expand rapidly.
For Tehran, practicing a constructive diplomacy towards the neighboring countries would be to some extent problematic. For years, Iran’s relationship with Saudi Arabia and some of its Southern neighbors has deteriorated. Tehran-Ankara engagement has represented a complex combination of cooperation and competition. However, with Erdogan's consolidation of political power, theTurkish-Iranian competition in Iraq and Syria would continue to rise. Certainly, the Islamic Republic would face lots of difficulties towards the renormalization of relations with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Relations between Tehran and Riyadh have been fraught with enmity, tension, and confrontation, due to the strategic competition between the two countries and their differences in political agendas, ideologies, governance, and religious identity. The two countries have taken widely divergent approaches towards the Shiite Houthis in Yemen, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the situations in Iraq and Syria. With the deepening hostility and formation of a Zero-Sum game between the two states, Constructive engagement with Saudi Arabia would have little chance to improve in the future.
In sum, with the implementation of the JCPOA, Rouhani has attempted to continue the policy of Constructive engagement towards the outside world. With no doubt, the success or failure of his government's initiative in foreign policy, would seriously affect Iran’s future as well as that of its neighbors.
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