Taking into account the nature of the SCO, as a key security institution in Eurasia, the problems of stable development of its member countries and close cooperation between them remain relevant tasks during the Kazakhstan’s presidency in the Organization. Nevertheless, recent events indicate growing negative trends in the SCO region and the adjacent areas. In this regard, the expert community of Central Asian countries, Russia and China are increasingly discussing the complex socio-political situation, including the worsening of the military and political situation in neighboring Afghanistan, the continuing challenges of extremism and terrorism in Russia and China, and the risk of destabilizing of the political situation in some countries of Central Asia.
Taking these factors into account, on the part of Kazakhstan’s chairmanship, the issue of primary importance is the one about the role and capabilities of the SCO to promote solutions of this complex of problems. In this regard, it’s necessary to analyze the problems facing the organization.
In this paper, we consider two main themes that are the basis for the interaction of the SCO member states in the framework of regional security: 1.Defining areas of responsibility of the SCO and its future expansion; 2.Afghan crisis in the context of security issues in Asia, as well as the role and position of the Central Asian countries, Russia and China, in resolving the situation in Afghanistan.
Area of Responsibility of the SCO and Its Future Expansion
Positive international precedent on the solutions of complex border issues between the five states, which resulted in a large-scale demilitarization of the border areas from the Japan Sea to the Pamir, it turned the Shanghai Five into the most famous and authoritative international organization in the world. After Uzbekistan’s entering into this structure, the SCO acquired the circuits, in which it currently operates quite successfully. Members of the Organization have great interest to take an active part in solving regional problems related to international terrorism, extremism and drug trafficking. However, the further deepening of cooperation in these areas among the six countries is constrained by the unresolved organizational problems.
One of the main issues for the SCO is to identify its areas of responsibility. Almost all the regional organizations of the world clearly delineate the scope of its activities on a specific political-geographical territory. For example, ASEAN’s area of action application is the South-East Asia, the EU - Europe, etc. In the case of the SCO the question remains unclear about where the organization can specifically focus its efforts? In official documents of the Organization, it is specified the “SCO region”, which generates a set of interpretations about the lack of specificity in the territorial definition of the specified region.
Meanwhile, the definition of clear-cut area of its future political maneuvering for the regional organizations is essential, since the uncertainty in the politico-geographical terms would be regarded as a factor that constantly restraining its further development.
In accordance with the Declaration of the Heads of States of the SCO,[①] the word “region” refers to the territory of all member countries of the Organization. However, in practice, often the activity or assessment of this structure is limited in the areas where security problems are solved entirely within the competence of national authorities or out-of-bounds due to existing interests of the SCO member-countries in a particular region of Asia. So, for example, in the official documents the member countries “are willing to see Afghanistan and the Asia-Pacific region as a zone of peace, stability and shared prosperity”[②] and this allows expanding the boundaries of the SCO. Moreover, it is assumed to spread the influence on those territorial areas, in which current processes may be of immediate security threat to the states, members or observers, of the Organization. In particular, Afghanistan, adjacent to Central Asia, is permanently located in the zone of interests of the SCO.
Thus, today's agenda is the task of clarifying several concepts that define the geographical field of activity of the SCO and are in need of unification - a zone of responsibility, the SCO region, and the zone of interests of the Organization. In order to improve the efficiency of this multilateral structure it is necessary to clarify these concepts and to clearly define the geography of joint efforts based on common interests in a particular area of the SCO member states or in the adjacent region. Taking everything above into account, this problem should be tabled in the expert, diplomatic and political communities of the member states.
In our view, as the most acceptable alternative spaces of the SCO responsibility can be offered to Central Asia as a key area of security, possibly with an extension of the traditional definition of the region according to UNESCO.[③] This interpretation of the territorial fixing of the SCO responsibility will reduce to the discussion of the problematic issues such as Taiwan for China and the North Caucasus for Russia. But at the same time, the coverage of virtually all states, somehow involved in the political dialogue. The only exception would be Turkmenistan, which has international status of a neutral country.
In addition, in parallel with the problem of determining the zone of responsibility of the SCO in the community of experts there is the question of its extension. For example, in China’s leading analytic centers there is an active discussion of the mentioned idea. The Director of the Center for the Study of Central Asia and SCO of Fudan University (Shanghai, China), Professor Zhao Huasheng believes that “The SCO should take the initiative in ensuring stability and security in a broader geographic scale, including such areas as Afghanistan, South Asia and the Caucasus.”[④]
In expert circles of other members of the Organization there is also the issue about possible expansion of the SCO area of responsibility. In our opinion, the majority of specialists from former Soviet countries do not support the expanding of the zone of responsibility of the SCO in the direction of the Afghan border, but they support the creation of a security belt around Afghanistan. With the same purpose in recent years there has been intensified discussion about giving the status of “dialogue partner” to Afghanistan.
However, it should be noted that there are opponents of the idea of expanding the area of responsibility of the SCO. For example, according to some Russian experts, the extension of the zone of responsibility entails an unavoidable complication of mechanisms for implementing the tasks entrusted to the Organization.[⑤] In particular, we are talking about the fact that expansion of the area of responsibility includes the expansion of the membership, primarily due to the observer countries, which, in turn, would bring a new range of challenges to the SCO.
Thus, among political scientists and researchers of the SCO there is an opinion about the expansion of the zone of responsibility towards the southern border of Central Asia. However, taking into account the uncertainty of the concept “zone of responsibility of the SCO”, it would be advisable to begin to geographically define and legally consolidate the existing area of focus of the SCO member states.
The SCO and the Afghan issue
The fight against international terrorism, extremism and drug trafficking became the main activity of the SCO in security under the influence of the challenges and threats, emanating from Afghanistan. In this connection, the SCO member states consider the setting of political and military situation in Afghanistan to be one of the main problems of security.
At the present stage, despite the lack of unity of opinion about the role and capabilities of the SCO in the Afghan settlement, the need to strengthen joint action to counter the threats emanating from Afghanistan, has an important place in foreign policy in Central Asia states, Russia and China.
For example, China, strengthening its “western regions”, increasingly penetrates into the regions of South and Central Asia, producing such action as the intention to extend the zone of responsibility of the SCO by vigorous participation in the process of resolving the situation in Afghanistan. Speaking for the extension of the zone of responsibility of the SCO, a number of Chinese researchers are in favor of the involvement of the key regional players such as Pakistan, Iran and India in the process of resolving the political situation in Afghanistan. At the same time there is the question about the need to accept these countries to the SCO on a regular basis.[⑥]
Taking into account the importance of early resolution of the Afghan problem in the security context of the Western regions of China, and Chinese economic projects implemented in Afghanistan, Chinese analysts also consider the possibility of Chinese participation in the struggle for the influence in this country. However, it should be noted that at present the official Chinese authorities do not intend to take part in a military settlement of the situation in Afghanistan.
Meanwhile, in recent years in most Chinese publications there has been prevailing negative assessment of NATO and the United States, due to the fear about long-term U.S. presence in Afghanistan and, in general, on the Asian continent.
In addition, you should pay attention to the fact that China's economic cooperation with Afghanistan is solely on a bilateral basis. This indicates that China is not ready to participate in the financing of infrastructure and other projects in Afghanistan through the mechanisms of the SCO.
The position of Russia and Central Asian republics about the participation of the SCO in the Afghan settlement is close to the Chinese one, but it still has some distinctive moments. For Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, one of the priorities in the direction of Afghanistan is the establishment of the so-called anti-drug belt. Uzbekistan and China also support this point of view; however, these countries solve the problem of combating illicit drug trafficking from Afghanistan on the level of national security, rather than through regional cooperation. As a result, the difference in the measures of member states against drug threat from Afghanistan, as well as the differences in the methods of its suppression leads to the inefficiency of the action of individual countries of the SCO in this direction. In addition, the task of creating anti-drug belt requires the participation of the observer countries of the SCO; especially it concerns the immediate neighbors of Afghanistan - Iran and Pakistan. In turn, the participation of these countries in combating drug trafficking from Afghanistan is ineffective without giving them full membership in the SCO. And the prospects of expanding of the Organization through the admission of observer countries remain rather vague because of the existing complex of problems in this issue.
A number of other Central Asian experts, when evaluating the potential of the SCO in solving the Afghan issue, indicate the need for a dialogue on Afghanistan with the USA and NATO on the basis of the SCO. In this context, noteworthy is the fact that today many of the political and military circles in the West express the view of the ineffectiveness of solving the Afghan problem without close neighbors of Afghanistan.
In this context, the proposal of the President Islam Karimov about the creation of a new UN-led international mechanism “6 3” became topical. Taking into consideration the fact that all members of the UN Security Council are under the proposed mechanism, this structure allows organizing an effective dialogue to solve the Afghan problem. The only disputable point of the parties is the vision of government's role in Afghanistan. Format “6 3” suggests that the current government of Afghanistan will serve as one of the parties of the settlement and not as a full participant in the negotiations. Uzbek initiative is supported by Russia, however, it is still uncertain how it will treat other members of the mechanism of the “6 3”, and other members of the SCO. At the same time, a weak point of the formula initiated by Uzbekistan is the exception out of the negotiation such countries as Kazakhstan and India, which also have an impact on the settlement of the Afghan problem.
Along with this, when assessing the prospects for the inclusion of the SCO countries in the process of Afghan settlement, we must also take into account the position of international actors present in Afghanistan. In particular, we should take into account how the situation will change in the region after the leaving of the international coalition forces and NATO.
As it is known, according to the new U.S. strategy in the field of security, which was announced in May 2010, NATO troops and the ISAF since 2014 will be removed from Afghanistan. The question of the withdrawal of Western troops from Afghanistan is actively discussed after the London and Kabul conference on the Afghan problem, where it was announced about the intention to pursue a new strategy, which essence is a combination of military and political efforts aimed at the gradual transfer of power to the central government of Afghanistan.
In this context, attention should be paid to the fact that in the preface to the new U.S. strategy in Afghanistan, B. Obama said, “in the fight against current threats, the USA cannot bear the burden only on its own shoulders.” It is also noted that “the USA must, in addition to the strengthening of the traditional alliances, create deeper and more effective partnerships with other key centers of influence - China, India, Russia.”[⑦] Such position of the USA suggests that perhaps the trend for worsening of the military and political situation in Afghanistan pushed Washington to change its views about the inclusion of the SCO countries to the Afghan settlement.
As is known, until now Washington was strongly against the SCO being drawn into Afghan process for the following reasons:
1. Full SCO connection to the process of settlement the situation in Afghanistan would strike the image of the United States and NATO, which could not stabilize the situation in that country for nine years;
2. In case of possible increase of its activities in Afghanistan, the SCO would certainly involve the potential of Iran and Pakistan and could eventually give them permanent membership in the Organization. In turn, the adoption of Iran and Pakistan to the SCO is not acceptable to the United States.
Kazakhstan’s interests in the Afghan settlement are primarily based on the fact that there is no military solution to this problem. In this regard, there is the need to settle the issue of Afghanistan with complex methods, which lie in the sphere of politics and economics. In this context, it is important to note that the Kazakh leadership has taken several practical measures to counter the threats emanating from Afghanistan. Kazakhstan’s initiative for the development of “Anti-drug strategy of the SCO for 2011-2016” is significant and it should enhance the effectiveness of measures aimed at combating drug trafficking.
Taking into account all the above views and positions of member states about the participation of the SCO in the Afghan settlement, Kazakhstan should focus the attention of the Organization on the issue of providing Afghanistan the status of the “dialogue partner” or the “observer country”. In the future it will contribute to the systematization of the contacts with Kabul, which are now limited to the participation of the leadership of this country as a visitor at the meetings of the Council of the SCO heads of state.
As a result, the prospects of the participation of the SCO in settlement the situation in Afghanistan remain quite unclear because of inconsistent positions of the member states in this question, as well as differences in the assessment of threats emanating from Afghanistan. Of course, all the SCO member states are interested in resolving the Afghan issue. Nevertheless, the question about the forms and nature of participation is still open.

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