2020年7月3日，上海国际问题研究员陈东晓院长参加了由巴西金砖政策研究中心举办的“新冠肺炎疫情后的中国与世界秩序”视频研讨会，并做题为“新冠肺炎疫情对国际体系的四重影响”的专题发言。本次视频研讨会由巴西金砖政策研究中心主任Paulo Esteves教授主持，其他发言嘉宾包括美利坚大学教授Amitav Acharya以及滑铁卢大学教授Andrew Coopoer。

附陈东晓院长发言要点：

The Four-fold Impact of COVID-19 on the International System

By Chen Dongxiao

Since the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) broke out at the turn of the year, the international society have gradually realized that the pandemic would be longer, wider, deeper and more destructive than we have expected. This once-in-a-century super pandemic, which happens when the world is going through unprecedented changes already, has brought about at least four “systemic impact” on the international system.  I have four general assessments.

First, COVID-19 pandemic undercuts the “world’s third wave of modernization” dominated by emerging economies and developing countries, adding uncertainties to the shifting international balance of power.

COVID-19 has dampened the growth prospects of both advanced and emerging economies that are highly dependent on global industrial and supply chains. An economic recession is set to happen, and the world is at greater risk of depression.

From a longer perspective however, the pandemic has revealed severe vulnerabilities in developing countries, including many emerging economies, which are faced with worrying prospects ahead. On the one hand, according to the Global Economic Prospects published by the World Bank in June, sub-Saharan African, South Asia, Middle East and North Africa, Central Asia as well as Caribbean area, which hosted most of the developing and Least developed countries, would have suffered unprecedented negative economic growth this year.

On the other hand, as they are confronted with multiple challenges, such as virus spreading, volatile external markets, rapidly shrinking demand, and global supply chain adjustment, their inherent problems have become more severe, for example, weakened public health emergency response systems, unbalanced industrial structures, and inadequate capacity to adapt to market shocks. All these will further aggravate their existing debt conditions, domestic development disparity, and income imbalances.

Compared with many developed economies, these internal strains are magnified by the epidemic, adding to their social and political turmoil. Therefore, protecting the economy, maintaining stability, and sustaining the government is the top priority of many developing countries.

In this context, the international community must unite as one to tame the virus as soon as possible and arrest the downturn of the world economy; and developing countries and regions must pursue reforms, adopt a new approach to development, upgrade their industries, and make their economies more resilient.

Otherwise, the world’s third wave of modernization that has accelerated in the developing world since the 1990s may stall for a long time to come. If the growth of many developing countries has lost its momentum, the dynamic of shift of international balance of power would change consequently.

Second, the COVID-19 pandemic has further strained China-US relations. A largely balanced and stable China-US relationship which has been based on coordination, cooperation and competition will no longer exist, thus increasing global strategic instability.

On May 20th, 2020, the White House issued the United States Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the Approach) once again explicitly repudiates the policy of engaging China, which has been consistently pursued by the US administrations since the 1990s.

Three “takeaways” are standing out from this “Strategic Approach”.

No.1, The Approach puts more emphasis on ideological competition and confrontation with China than the 2017 National Security Strategy, highlighting the conflicting values between China and the US, gives prominence to differences in values and systems between the two countries. It is nothing but an attempt to lay a theoretical basis for the US strategy to contain China.

No.2, The Approach shows that the Trump administration’s competitive strategy towards China, which was initially pushed by the Republicans, is now pursued by both Democrats and Republicans in the Congress. Even if the Democratic Party assumes power in the future, its China strategy will largely continue on such a tone of competition.

No. 3, What is particularly noteworthy is that the Trump administration is stepping up efforts to create a “ international united front against China”. The US goes all out to prevent China from expanding its influence by building and strengthening political security alliances. It presses ahead with trade and technology arrangements excluding China, and multilateral mechanisms including D10 that impose technology and investment restrictions on China. Most recent case in point is the “Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China” announced on June 5th by hawkish US and Western lawmakers, who have hyped up “China threat”.

In short, COVID-19 has dealt heavy blows to the Chinese and American economies, causing difficulties in implementing the Phase One Trade Deal. For re-election purposes, the Trump administration blames China for its own failures to contain the epidemic. The nosedive in bilateral relations has gone far beyond expectation. If the two sides cannot manage their differences as quickly as possible, risks will run high that the confrontation may escalate and spiral out of control due to miscalculation, which will increase the intensity and frequency of global strategic instability.

Third, the pandemic highlights the lack of leadership in multilateral cooperation, which is at risk of “fragmentation” and “ideologicalization”.

At present, the global governance process is being transformed and reshaped. The global governance system is under the pressure of being divided and weakened due to three driving forces.

No.1, with the strategic competition among big countries intensified, the strategic environment for global governance is deteriorating, and the threat of global strategic instability is rising. Thus, big powers have been divided and re-grouped on global issues, causing a reduction in the willingness and level of cooperation in the global governance system.

No.2, at a time when right-wing populism runs rampant and digital economy booms, the open world system in which global governance operates is facing a fragmentation crisis. On the one hand, economic globalization has aggravated the inherent problems in the political and economic systems in the US and the wider Western world, intensified socio-economic division and political polarization, and provided strong domestic support for right-wing populists to incite anti-globalization sentiments of protectionism and neo-isolationism. On the other hand, mankind is on the threshold of digital economy. The international patterns of production, innovation and competition are being transformed at an accelerated pace. Meanwhile, the cross-border data management in the global digital economy is increasingly Balkanized. As science and technology are deeply connected with national security concerns, “technological nationalism” is on the rise, the international network of cooperation on science, technology and industry is at greater risk of breaking up, and the open world economic system is facing a fragmentation crisis.

No.3, the ineffective multilateral governance system and capacity has exacerbated the “trust deficit” of the international community in the global governance mechanism.

More importantly, the international community still needs to develop a set of global governance concepts that conform to the trend of the times, embody the spirit of fairness, justice, and based on consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits.

Therefore, on issues such as sustainable development and non-traditional security, the lack of leadership and the intense ideological struggles in multilateral cooperation and global governance have become a normal, at least in the short and medium term.

Fourth, the pandemic has intensified the fragility and instability in the ecosystem of human society, accelerating the return to the era of “strong gevernment”.

We live in the era of “anthropocene”. I want to emphasize that, whether climate change or the COVID-19 pandemic，these challenges have highlighted the reality of world where we live in which it is complex system with increasingly tight connection btw biophysical systems and socioeconomic systems.

The impact of the pandemic on this socioeconomic system has been again manifested in three aspects: No,1, the global ecological and environmental protection may backslide after the epidemic. Economies, which are either “cash-strapped” or under pressure to “protect the economy”, may relax restrictions on investment in highly-polluting and high-emission businesses, thus undermining the emission reduction and low carbon efforts of the international community in the past decades, making the ecological system of human society more vulnerable.

Second, the security risks of the digital economy will increase significantly after the epidemic. The epidemic has made people more dependent on digital technology. “Touchless economy” and “working from home”, as evidenced by the application of big data to epidemic control, tele-medicine, online education, and livestream advertising, have become the new normal. However, risks and challenges such as cyber attacks, data fraud, personal privacy, digital divide, and fragmentation of cross-border data management have also risen exponentially, highlighting security risks in the era of digital economy.

Third, a number of countries and regions, including developed and developing countries, have to tackle weaknesses and growing risks of disorder in social governance at home. At some epicenters of the pandemic, there have been disproportionately more deaths among vulnerable groups such as ethnic minorities and the poor. This shows that development in these societies is not inclusive and balanced. The epidemic has exposed and magnified the deficiencies in the governance systems of these countries and regions.

After the outbreak of the epidemic, there have been growing calls worldwide for improving government effectiveness and redressing failures in market and social governance. For countries, their top priority in capacity building will be building effective governments.

In short, the COVID-19 pandemic wakes us to the fact that we are living in a “high-risk, turbulent, and more fragile” complex socioeconomic system. The pandemic has magnified and intensified the inherent problems in the international system, accelerated the changes that are already underway, and increased the risk of quantitative changes evolving into to qualitative transformation. Only by more accurately identifying the pathways and mechanisms through which systemic risks occur and spread can we be fully prepared and turn crises into opportunities.